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The Corporation as Client: Problems,
Perspectives, and Partial Solutions
by
JAMES R. MCCALL*
Corporations have long been an extremely important type of client
for American attorneys. However common the corporation as client
may be, application of traditional professional responsibility concepts to
the relationship between a client corporation and its attorney is often an
awkward endeavor. The difficulty exists because a corporation remains
an abstraction, even to those who labor in its behalf, while the profes-
sional responsibility norms are designed to regulate the provision of legal
services to concrete individuals.
The sophisticated complaints of Ralph Jonas, which appear in the
preceding pages,' are similar to reservations undoubtedly voiced by
many practitioners and scholars over the years. Mr. Jonas focuses his
remarks on the corporate client-attorney relationship during an un-
friendly takeover attempt upon the corporation. An unfriendly takeover
attempt naturally sharpens instincts for managerial self-preservation.
This understandable consequence of the takeover tends to raise, in bold
relief, the question of the obligations of a lawyer employed by a corpora-
tion (a corporation lawyer) when there is antagonism between the inter-
ests of various collective or individual components, or "constituencies,"
of the corporation.2 Although usually less dramatic than in hostile take-
over situations, actual or potential constituent antagonism and possible
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Member
California Bar. B.A. 1958, Pomona College; J.D. 1962, Harvard University.
1. See Jonas, Who is the Client: The Corporate Lawyer's Dilemma, 39 HASTINGS L.J.
617 (1988).
2. The constituents of a particular corporation include the collective directors, manag-
ers, employees, and classes of shareholders, as well as individual directors and managers. The
term is used in the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules).
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 comment (1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. The Rules, and the proposed final draft of the Rules, provide the best basis
for the analysis of the professional obligations of a corporation's attorney and are a central
focus of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28, 39-43, 48-54.
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confusion over the professional loyalty of the corporation's lawyer are
constants of corporate law practice.
Such antagonisms arise most frequently in the situation in which an
executive commits a negligent or intentionally wrongful act while carry-
ing out his or her duties-in general terms, an act of "constituent mis-
conduct." If the executive seeks to keep the misconduct secret from his
or her superiors, including the corporation's board of directors, the exec-
utive's interest in such secrecy is antagonistic to the interests of other
managers, the board of directors, and the shareholders. 3 While the rules
of professional loyalty provided by courts and other arbiters of profes-
sional ethics are not wholly satisfactory in a hostile takeover situation,
those rules are nonetheless as satisfactory when a takeover is in prospect
as they are at any other time in the life of a corporation.
Mr. Jonas makes a number of points that, for the most part, are
beyond dispute. First, the proposition that a corporation lawyer owes
professional allegiance solely to the corporation as an abstract entity,
rather than to the officers and directors who select, pay, and determine
the lawyer's retention or to the shareholders who own the corporation is
psychologically awkward. 4 Second, in a hostile takeover situation, when
the board and management seek advice and scrivener's work on any
number of self-protective devices such as staggered terms, 5 "golden
parachutes,"' 6 and "poison pills,"' 7 the corporation attorney will have
3. It would, perhaps, be less awkward to refer to a "conflict" between the interests of the
executive and those of the board and the shareholders. I have chosen, however, to use "antag-
onism," for the reason that a "conflict" of interests in the law of professional responsibility is
traditionally associated with a difference in the interests between two clients of one attorney.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 5-105 (1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. A basic point in the law of professional
responsibility relating to the obligations of a corporate lawyer is that the corporation is the
lawyer's sole and exclusive client. Thus, in most instances, there is no traditional conflict of
interests present in the constituent antagonism situation and to use the term "conflict" might
raise confusing implications.
4. Jonas, supra note 1, at 617.
5. The "staggered terms" device refers to changing the terms of office of the target cor-
poration's board of directors so that the terms overlap, rather than having all of the terms of
the board members begin and end at the same time. After the terms are staggered, only a
portion of the terms of the target corporation's board will become open for reelection in a
given year. Thus, this anti-takeover device increases the amount of time required before the
takeover company can complete a turnover in management. 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 334.1 (perm. ed. 1982); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.20, at 380 (1985).
6. A "golden parachute" is a contract entered into between the corporation and a corpo-
rate officer under which the officer, upon retirement or dismissal in the event of a takeover,
receives a large severance bonus. Technically such contracts are less a method of deterring a
hostile takeover, than a last ditch attempt to provide a very easy exit, after the takeover is
completed, for the old management. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS
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very good cause to wonder if he or she is serving best the interests of the
corporation or those of the corporation's officers. 8 Third, since the cor-
poration's board of directors has a heavy fiduciary obligation to act only
for the best interests of the corporation, as long as the board fulfills its
duty, an attorney should owe his or her loyalty to the board without
thinking of the corporate entity as the "client." 9
In response to these points, it could be said that the concept of the
corporation entity as client is far from the only counter-intuitive abstrac-
tion found in the law, that attorneys in many contexts have to appraise
self-seeking acts to determine if those acts violate the legal rights of their
clients, and that, as a practical matter, the professional standards of con-
duct do allow corporation lawyers to look to a corporation's board of
directors as an effective surrogate for the "client." 10 A more useful re-
sponse, however, is to consider whether there is a better principle than
that of the entity as client to guide attorneys in constituent antagonism
situations. Once the best principle for attorney loyalty is established, it is
a separate question whether the available standards for proper profes-
sional conduct adequately translate the principle into workable guide-
lines for practitioners. While it appears to be the consensus view that the
entity as client principle should control a corporation lawyer's profes-
sional loyalty, the most recently promulgated rules of professional con-
duct are partially inconsistent with the entity as client concept, and
apparently follow the idea advanced by Mr. Jonas that a corporation
lawyer should consider the board of directors as his or her client.11
This Article will discuss the development of the entity as client con-
cept, the consistency of that concept with the principles of corporations
and agency law, and the soundness of the concept as a matter of public
JUDGMENT RULE 170-72 (1987). Of course the size of the severance bonuses which the take-
over bidder will have to honor upon assuming control of the corporation may serve to deter
the bid.
7. A "poison pill" is a conditional stock right that, if triggered by a partially completed
takeover, gives a shareholder in the target corporation the option to purchase newly issued
stock at a very large discount from market price. This will greatly increase both the number of
shares that must be purchased and the total price that must be paid by the person or entity
seeking to complete the takeover by means of purchasing a controlling percentage of the stock
of the target corporation. P. RICHTER, CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE
POISON PILL DEVICE at xix (1987).
8. Jonas, supra note 1, at 618-21.
9. Id. at 621-22.
10. While the first two responses, pointing out that abstractions and appraisals of legality
are a lawyer's bread and butter and no cause to eliminate the entity as client notion are self
evident, the third response is given the elaboration it requires infra text accompanying notes
53-54.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 48-54.
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policy. This Article then asserts that the solution for corporation lawyer
loyalty questions lies in a proposed, but unadopted, provision of the final
draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. That provision would
reduce significantly the restrictions currently obstructing attorneys from
acting in the best interests of client corporations.
Development of the Entity as Client Concept
The corporation concept is poorly suited for the application of many
legal principles developed to order a society composed of flesh and blood
individuals. Writing fifty years ago, a Minnesota Supreme Court Justice
put it well:
A corporation is not a person, but has a legal and real individual-
ity. Neither is it artificial, save as it is a generation of law rather than
nature. It is in simple fact a legal unit-a very real one-endowed by
its creator with many of the rights and attributes of persons. It is so
much sui generis that to attempt to define it, rather than to describe or
enumerate its peculiar features, in terms of the law of persons, tends to
obstruct rather than facilitate comprehension.
12
While rigidly adopting the fiction that corporations are "persons"
may produce some confusion, the basic structure of English and Ameri-
can law was designed for regulating persons' activities. It is thus inevita-
ble that the law will view corporations, to the greatest possible degree, as
if these abstract entities were individuals. Noting this tension, Justice
Rutledge identified the basic cause of the difficulty in fixing attorney loy-
alty duties in situations of corporate-constituent antagonism:
The process of translating group or institutional relations in terms
of individual ones, and so keeping them distinct from the non-group
relations of the people whose group rights are thus integrated, is peren-
nial, not only because the law's norm is so much the individual man,
but also because the continuing evolution of institutions more and
more compels fitting them into individualistically conceived legal
patterns. 13
Given the difficulty of accommodating the corporation concept into
the framework of a legal system premised upon individual action, it is not
surprising that the rules governing lawyers, the technicians of the legal
system, have been unclear on the subject of an attorneys' obligations to
corporate clients. On at least four occasions, large national attorneys'
organizations have written codes of ethics for the profession. The more
recent codes were promulgated with the hope that the states, which li-
cense and control the practice of law within their borders, would adopt
12. In re Clarke's Will, 204 Minn. 574, 578, 284 N.W. 876, 878 (1939) (Stone, J.).
13. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 803 (1948).
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the organization's proposal in much the same manner as the Commission
on Uniform State Laws has adopted model acts with the largely realized
expectation of adoption by individual states.
Three of these model code efforts were made by the largest volun-
tary organization of lawyers, the American Bar Association (ABA) and
each of the three received wide adoption within a few years after promul-
gation. The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA), a much
younger professional group than the ABA, produced the fourth code,
which no state has yet adopted.
The first ABA drafted code, the Canons of Professional Ethics (Ca-
nons), appeared in 1908. Thirty-one state bar associations adopted the
Canons from 1908 to 1914.14 The Canons made no reference to corpora-
tions or to any particular difficulties that attorneys might encounter in
performing legal services for such clients. Accordingly, this section does
not undertake a detailed analysis of the Canons. This section focuses on
the later ABA codes, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and briefly discusses the
ATLA code, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct.
A. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The second ABA code, the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity (Code), was officially adopted in 1970. The Code specifically recog-
nized corporations and embraced the entity as client concept to guide a
corporation lawyer's professional loyalty.15
The Code's discussion of the corporation as client is limited to one
paragraph in a document of over fifty pages. More importantly, the dis-
cussion is included in an Ethical Consideration (EC), a nonbinding and
aspirational statement, as opposed to the Code's mandatory "Discipli-
nary Rules" (DR).' 6 Specifically, EC 5-18 states that an attorney re-
tained by a "corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the
entity" and not to any constituent of the corporation.17 The Code ad-
vises that, when rendering legal services to the corporation, the corpora-
tion attorney should keep the corporation's interest paramount and
should avoid being influenced by any constituent's desires. While EC 5-
18 authorizes a corporation lawyer also to represent individual corporate
constituents, such as an officer or shareholder, such additional represen-
tation can only be undertaken or maintained "if the lawyer is convinced
14. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 54 n.21 (1986).
15. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 5-18.
16. Id. Preliminary Statement.
17. Id. EC 5-18.
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that differing interests are not present."' 8
In explicitly embracing the entity concept to determine the identity
of the client to whom a corporation's lawyer owes loyalty, the Code was
consistent with the well-developed substantive corporation law principle
that corporations are separate juristic persons for many purposes, includ-
ing entering into contracts with employees, customers, and suppliers. 19
Since the separate corporate entity employs the lawyer, it was at least a
consistent step to establish that an attorney's obligation of loyalty ran
toward the corporation, his or her employer.
Within the first five years after the promulgation of the Code, forty-
nine states approved the Code as a replacement for the Canons. 20
Notwithstanding this rapid acceptance, the ABA appointed a commis-
sion to evaluate the Code in 1977. The commission, noting technical and
substantive deficiencies in the Code, recommended the drafting of a new
body of professional standards to propose to the states. One area in
which the commission found the Code deficient was the subject of an
attorney's loyalty to an organizational client.2
1
B. The ABA Model Rules
After several years of drafting, discussion, and revision, the commis-
sion submitted its Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Final Draft) to the ABA House of Delegates in 1981.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) adopted by the House
of Delegates two years later differ in several pertinent respects from the
Final Draft. Because the portions of the commission's proposal on the
professional responsibilities of a corporation lawyer that were rejected by
the House of Delegates were well thought out, as well as intensely con-
18. Id.
19. The right to enter into contracts as a legal entity to the same extent as a natural
person, along with perpetual succession and the rights to participate in law suits, hold title to
lands, and make by-laws, was recognized in Blackstone's Commentaries in 1765. 1 W. BLACK-
STONE COMMENTARIES *275-76. The right to contract has been a constant feature of corpo-
rate existence to the present day. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATION § 79,
at 148 (3d ed. 1983); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.02(7) (1984). It is somewhat
surprising that limited liability, which is today virtually synonymous with the corporate entity
concept, was not a certain legal consequence of the corporate business form until the mid-
nineteenth century in England and the United States. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra § 79,
at 148 n.2.
20. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, § 2.6.3, at 56-57, 57 n.46. California was the one state
that chose not to adopt the substantive provisions of the Code, although eight other states
chose to adopt only the Canons and Disciplinary Rules from the Code without the Ethical
Considerations. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Chairman's Introduction at v
(Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter FINAL DRAFT].
21. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, Chairman's Introduction at V.
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troversial, this Article will review the Final Draft provisions on the
subject.
The Final Draft, like the eventually adopted Rules, contained
mandatory Model Rules and comments, which contain explanations and
amplifications of the prohibitions and duties set out in the Model Rules.
22
In both the Final Draft and the Rules, rule 1.13, entitled "Organization
as the Client," dealt with the specific topic of the loyalty of an attorney
employed by a corporation. The Model Rule 1.13 consists of five sub-
parts, (a) through (e). The language of each of the five subparts of Final
Draft rule 1.13 was changed in the Rules version, but only subpart (c)
was changed in a truly significant manner.
23
As previously established by EC 5-18 of the Code, subpart (a) re-
22. The Final Draft also contained elaborate drafter's Notes containing Code compari-
sons and discussion of relevant case law. The ABA House of Delegates decided to delete the
Final Draft Notes from the Rules which it approved. 1
23. In order to assist the reader in following the analysis in the text, the provisions, in
their entirety are set forth, with the differences noted in italics.
The Final Draft provided:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained to represent an organization represents the
organization as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders
or other constituent&
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses
to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation
to the organization, and is likely to result in material injury to the organization, the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organiza-
tion. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the
seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's
representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of
the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any
other relevant considerations. The measures taken shall be designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include
among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presenta-
tion to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can
act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) When a matter has been referred to the organization's highest authority in
accordance with paragraph (b), and that authority insists upon action, or refuses to
take action, that is clearly a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a
violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to
result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may take further remedial
action that the lawyer reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the organization.
Such action may include revealing information relating to the representation of the
organization only if the lawyer reasonably believes that:
(1) the highest authority in the organization has acted to further the personal or
March 1988]
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states the principle that a lawyer employed by an organization, such as a
corporation, owes his or her duty of loyalty to the organization and not
financial interests of members of that authority which are in conflict with the interests
of the organization, and
(2) revealing the information is necessary in the best interest of the organization.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when necessary to avoid misunderstandings on their part.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its direc-
tors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, Rule 1.13 (emphasis added).
The Rules version provides:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses
to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation
to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organi-
zation. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the
seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's
representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of
the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any
other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include
among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presenta-
tion to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can
act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to
act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constitu-
ents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its direc-
tors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the
shareholders.
MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13 (emphasis added).
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to its constituents. In subpart (e), rule 1.13 restates the second significant
provision of EC 5-18, which permits corporation lawyers to represent
constituents of the corporation as well as the entity, as long as there are
no conflicts of interest adversely affecting the attorney's ability to repre-
sent jointly the corporation and the constituent.2 4 The authorization of
joint representation is not inconsistent with the entity as client principal,
since permitting joint representation of two separate clients does not im-
ply any position on the identity of the primary client in constituent an-
tagonism cases. 25
24, As would be expected, consent of both clients in joint representation situations is
required in both the Code and the Rules. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 5-105; MODEL
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.7. Both the Final Draft and the Rules versions of rule 1.13
require that the consent of the corporation to the joint representation be given by an appropri-
ate official of the corporation "other than the individual who is to be represented .... FINAL
DRAFT, supra note 20, Rule 1.13; MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13. The Rules version
of rule 1. 13 also allows the consent to be given by the shareholders of the corporation. See id.
Rule 1.7 generally requires client consent to joint representation of clients whose interests
conflict. See id. Rule 1.7.
25. Authorizing joint representation of a corporation and a constituent, however, does
allow situations to occur that may well exacerbate the inherent problems caused by the identity
of the corporate client. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 13. If a corporation attorney
also represents an officer of the corporation personally, the natural presumption of confidenti-
ality the officer would feel toward the officer's attorney may make it all the more likely that the
officer may confide to the attorney that the officer has engaged in constituent misconduct. The
corporation lawyer would generally have the obligation to inform the client including, in some
circumstances, the board of directors, as the "higher authority" mentioned in rule 1.13. Under
rule 1.6, however, all attorneys must preserve the confidences of his or her clients (including
the officer). Thus, an irreconcilable conflict in the professional obligations of the corporate
lawyer arises.
The conflict will, absent consent from the officer for the attorney to disclose the mis- or
malfeasance to the corporation, make the attorney's position impermissible under rule 1.7.
Accordingly, the lawyer must withdraw from representing one, and quite probably both,
clients. Information the corporation needs to know (the officer's constituent misconduct) can
never be disclosed to the corporation. Therefore, loyalty to the client corporation demands
that the corporation lawyer withdraw from representing the corporation to allow the organiza-
tion to employ a lawyer who will be free to detect, independent of the first corporation lawyer's
knowledge, the constituent misconduct.
Following the lawyer's withdrawal from representation of the corporation, the interests of
the officer client and the former corporation client will almost invariably conflict on the matter
of the constituent misconduct. The former corporation lawyer cannot, absent consent by the
corporation, use any information he or she learned as the corporation lawyer in defending the
interests of the officer client regarding the constituent misconduct. Thus, the lawyer could not
continue to represent the officer regarding the officer's relationship with the corporation.
Obviously, the corporation lawyer's resignation may alert the organization to suspect that
the officer client has engaged in constituent misconduct; but that drawback appears unavoida-
ble. It is also obvious that a lawyer who chooses to represent both a corporation and a constit-
uent of that organization should make sure, at the outset of the joint representation, that the
constituent is well aware of the lawyer's duty to inform the corporation of constituent miscon-
duct under MR 1.13(b). Under MR 1.2(c), which allows for limited representation, it may be
possible for the corporation lawyer and the constituent client to agree, at the outset of the
March 1988]
The Notes to the Final Draft rule 1.13 establish that the entity as
client principle is not only consistent with other aspects of the substan-
tive law of corporate contracts, but is also derived from the law of
agency. 26 Under agency law, all employees, officers, directors, and attor-
neys of a corporation are co-agents of the same principal, the corpora-
tion. This general principle has at least three specific legal consequences
that are relevant to a consideration of the proper identity of the corpora-
tion lawyer's client.
First, each co-agent is liable to the principal for acts of constituent
misconduct during the course of his or her employment and the co-agent
has no general liability to fellow co-agents for such acts. The concept of
co-agency also establishes that the principal, and not another co-agent, is
liable to the co-agent for his or her compensation. Third, it is the princi-
pal, and not another co-agent, who is generally liable to third parties for
the co-agent's misconduct in the performance of his duties. Thus, the
general legal liabilities run directly between a corporation lawyer, as co-
agent, and the corporation, as principal. It would therefore be illogical
to extinguish the attorney's duty of loyalty to the corporation and make
the attorney's duty run to the board of directors, which has neither a
general legal obligation to pay the lawyer for his or her services, nor to
answer for the quality of the lawyer's work.
A significant initial concern of the drafters of rule 1.13 was whether
the entity as client concept should be adjusted to allow or require a cor-
poration attorney to divulge confidential information to persons outside
the corporation in order to prevent the client from causing harm through
commission of a fraud or crime that would cause injury to third parties.
27
One reason for the controversy over this issue was the position advanced
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the early 1970s in
the well-known National Student Marketing litigation.28 In that case, the
SEC argued that a corporation lawyer had aided and abetted a violation
of the federal securities laws if the lawyer learned of the corporation's
past violation of those laws and failed to report the violation to the Com-
mission.29 The court rejected the SEC argument in the case, but the ar-
representation, that the lawyer is free to report any constituent client misconduct to the corpo-
ration. If permissible, such an agreement would avoid the possible future conflict between
professional obligations for the lawyer described above.
26. See FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, Rule 1.13 Note on Legal Background, at 87-88.
27. See FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, Chairman's Introduction at ii.
28. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
29. See the Securities and Exchange Commission complaint filed in SEC v. National Stu-
dent Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C.
1972).
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gument stirred great controversy in the legal profession, raising the
question of the propriety of attorneys assuming an "audit" or "whistle
blowing" function in regards to client conduct.
30
The SEC based its position upon the premise that lawyers engaged
in securities work wield great power. The SEC reasoned that such power
requires lawyers to assume the obligation of taking extreme steps to pre-
vent the culmination of legally questionable client plans that may involve
substantial financial harm to American investors. 31 Others have sug-
gested a second premise for ascribing an audit function to corporation
lawyers: Organizations having the financial size and power that corpora-
tions are deemed to possess should not be entitled to the type of highly
protective loyalty to which clients who lack such economic power are
clearly entitled.
32
The American Bar Association responded to the SEC argument in
1975 with a statement of policy on the application of the Code provisions
to the work of securities lawyers. 33 The ABA statement rejected the
SEC position, strongly embraced the entity as client concept, and fore-
shadowed the eventual substantive content of Model Rule 1.13. In gen-
eral, the ABA took the unequivocal position that a corporation lawyer
performing securities work was only obligated to follow the procedures
30. In National Student Marketing, the court held that the corporation lawyers had aided
and abetted the securities law violation by completing a merger transaction that the lawyers
knew had been approved by affected shareholders on the basis of materially misleading infor-
mation. 457 F. Supp. at 712. The court rejected the argument that the lawyers had also aided
and abetted the violation by failing to report the violation to the SEC after the merger had
occurred because "such subsequent... inaction by the attorneys could not substantially assist
the merger." Id. at 712-13; see also Koch, Attorney's Liabililty: The Securities Bar and The
Impact of National Student Marketing, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1973); Lipman, The
SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437 (1973); Patter-
son, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discretion and the Law of Legal Ethics: National Student
Marketing Revisited, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1251.
31. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the
New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 424 (1974)
SEC considers the securities lawyer to have a "position of trust at the very heart of the invest-
ment process; the decisions that he makes regarding [disclosure] to the investing public may
affect the savings of millions of people"); see, e.g., Lipman, supra, note 30 at 441 (SEC con-
tends that lawyers owe primary duties to the securities market and investors); see also Koch,
supra, note 30 at 885 (SEC "has taken the position that the attorney practicing in the securities
field owes responsbility not only to his client, but to the investing public as well"). )
32. See, e.g., Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (D. Luban ed. 1984).
33. Statement of Policy by American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Lia-
bilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Adminis-
tered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, reprinted in 61 A.B.A. J. 1085, 1086 (1975)
[hereinafter Statement of Policy].
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indicated in the Code. 34 Furthermore, the statement asserted that an at-
torney acting in accordance with the SEC view on informing to stop past
or present client wrongdoing would violate the Code's ethical require-
ments. Specifically, the statement adjured attorneys not to reveal infor-
mation learned from a client to a third party, including the SEC, unless
the client's obligation to reveal the information is "clearly established,"
which means that no "reasonable doubt exists concerning the client's ob-
ligation of disclosure."' 35 In such situations, the Code's DR 4-101 would
seem to apply, providing an attorney freedom to reveal client confidences
in order to prevent the client from committing a crime. 36
Seven years after the ABA statement, the Supreme Court strongly
endorsed the entity as client concept in Upjohn Co. v. United States.37
The issue before the Court was whether the evidentiary privilege shield-
ing communications between an attorney and client applied to communi-
cations between a number of lower level executives of the corporation
and the corporation's attorney. 38 The communications in question were
written responses to a questionnaire prepared by the corporation's lawyer
calling for information about suspected corporate bribery of foreign gov-
ernment officials. The Sixth Circuit held that the privilege did not apply
to the responses, basing its holding on the trial court's finding that the
executives responding to the questionnaire were not within the "control
group" of senior executives entitled to "control or even to take a substan-
tial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney. '39
The so-called control group test applied by the circuit court had
been used previously by lower federal courts, which reasoned that only
an executive who can control, or at least substantially participate in mak-
34. While the statement speaks in terms of the Code requirements and obligations, it is
more accurate to say that the guidance in the Code was less clear cut than those terms would
imply. Nonetheless, the ABA statement accurately reflects the implications of the Code for
corporation or securities lawyers.
35. Statement of Policy, supra note 33, at 1086. The statement develops and clarifies this
pronouncement in a rather puzzling manner by indicating that the attorney may be free to
disclose client confidences.
36. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 4-101(c)(3). It is a crime to wilfully fail to
comply with the stock issuance disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.
37. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
38. Upjohn's general counsel solicited and received the communications in question. Id.
at 386-87. The Supreme Court, and all courts below, drew no distinction between such "in-
house" attorneys and "outside" attorneys for the purpose of applying the attorney-client privi-
lege. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395; 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979); 41 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
78-796, 78-800 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
39. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (citing Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1226 and quoting Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
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ing decisions on corporate action, "is (or personifies) the corporation"
when communicating with the corporation's attorney.4° The Supreme
Court rejected the control group test and held the low-level executive
communications were privileged. The express premise of the decision
was that the attorney-client communication privilege should protect the
processes used by a corporation lawyer to collect the information neces-
sary to adequately render legal advice to the client.41 The Court thereby
re-emphasized that the corporation as an entity is the client of the corpo-
ration lawyer, and determined that it is irrelevant if certain constituents
of the corporation appear to "be" or "personify" the corporation.
In summary, the entity as client concept is supported by the logic of
traditional doctrine in the fields of corporations and agency law and has
been validated by a very recent Supreme Court decision. Aside from
legal doctrine and precedent, a public policy argument also supports the
entity as client concept. Investment by individuals in corporations is uni-
versally acknowledged to stimulate the economy and benefit society, and
legal doctrines making such investment more likely are therefore desired.
Corporate investment is more likely to occur if the investors know that
their interests, to the extent of the value of their stock in the corporate
entity, are the focus of the professional concern of the corporation law-
yer, rather than if investors must question if the lawyer's focus is the
legal well-being of influential corporate constituents.
Accordingly, the entity as client concept was firmly established in
subpart (a) of the Final Draft version of Model Rule 1.13 and-subpart (b)
specifically imposes a duty on the corporation lawyer who learns of con-
stituent misconduct to take measures to protect the best interests of the
corporation, including referring the matter, if necessary, to the corpora-
tion's board of directors.42 All such measures taken by the attorney must
40. To avoid confusion, and to note the Supreme Court's stress on the theoretical premise
underlying the control group test, consider the full quotation amplifying the test:
"Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation which is seeking the
lawyer's advice when the asserted privileged communication is made?, the most satis-
factory solution, I think, is that if the employee making the communication, of
whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the
attorney .... then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his
disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. at 485) (emphasis
supplied by the Supreme Court).
As noted in the text, the Court rejected the control group test after this quotation. See id.
at 392-93.
41. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
42. Rule 1.13(b)(3) authorizes the corporate attorney to report constituent misconduct
"to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
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be consistent with the duty of confidentiality, which binds the attorney
not to reveal confidential information relating to the representation of the
corporation.43 In practical terms, this means not revealing the informa-
tion to anyone outside the corporation, and, within the corporation, re-
vealing it only to those persons who necessarily must be informed to
protect the corporation's interests.
In both the Final Draft and the Rules, subparts (a) and (b) of rule
1.13 are consistent with the entity as client concept, and, with minor
variations of wording, the subparts have the same meaning.44 Subpart
(d), which sets out an explicit ethical obligation of a corporation lawyer,
was also virtually the same in the Final Draft version as in the Rules.
Under the entity as client concept, because the attorney must protect the
corporation's interests, even if it requires informing the board of direc-
tors of an individual employee's misconduct, it is correct to give the law-
yer the specific duty to inform the constituents with whom the lawyer
works that he has a professional duty to report constituent misconduct to
higher authorities. Thus, Model Rule 1.13(d) requires the attorney to
"explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organiza-
tion's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing."
'4 5
It is interesting to compare Model Rule 1.13(d) with the provisions
of the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Code of Conduct), adopted
by the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation in 1982. The
Code of Conduct, which no state has yet adopted, apparently rejects the
law." MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13(b)(3). This langauge was in the Final Draft and
was continued almost verbatim into the Rules. The Comments to the Final Draft rule 1.13
stated, however, that the phrase "highest authority" could, in some situations include the in-
dependent members of the board of directors, id. Rule 1.13 comment (The Entity as Client),
meaning those members of the board who were not also company officers. H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 19, § 204, at 553 n.17. The Final Draft comment also specifically
discussed the situations in which the corporation's attorney might take a matter beyond the
board to the shareholders of the company. In the Rules, as finally adopted, any reference to
the shareholders as possible "highest authority" and any discussion of going beyond the board
with a matter of constituent misconduct was omitted.
43. The requirement that a corporation lawyer comply with all other rules of professional
conduct when acting in accordance with rule 1.13 is expressly stated in the Comment to the
rule. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13 comment. See rule 1.6(a) for the Rules formula-
tion of the duty of confidentiality and the exceptions to the general rule of secrecy. Also note
the discussion of the interaction of rule 1.6 and rule 1.13(c) in the text infra note 53.
44. As discussed, supra note 42, there is a significant difference in the comments that
foreshadow the deviation of the Rules subpart (c) from both the language and the entity as
client concept embraced in the Final Draft subpart (c).
45. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13(d). In the Final Draft version of subpart (d),
the obligation to "explain the identity of the client" arose "when necessary to avoid misunder-
standing" on the part of the constituents. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, Rule 1.13(d).
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entity as client concept and substitutes the board of directors as the cor-
poration lawyer's client in the area of constituent antagonisms.
46
Rule 2.5 of the Code of Conduct requires a corporation attorney to
bring potential constituent antagonisms to the attention of the board of
directors "as early as possible in the lawyer-client relationship" for the
purpose of receiving a board policy instruction of the attorney's duties in
such situations.47 In contrast to Model Rule 1.13(d), rule 2.5 places a
positive duty upon the attorney to act early to prevent misplacement of
confidence by constituents. Finally, rule 2.5 requires the attorney who
has received a policy from the board to "take reasonable steps to ensure
that officers with whom the lawyer deals, and the shareholders, are made
aware of how the lawyer has been instructed to resolve conflicts of
interest.
'48
The major divergence between the Final Draft and the Rules is
found in subpart (c). In that subpart, the Rules version differs markedly
from the Final Draft version in language, prescribed duties, and identity
of the client concept.49 Subpart (c) addresses the obligation of the corpo-
ration lawyer who has reported constituent misconduct to the board of
directors, and the board has refused to follow the attorney's recomenda-
tions to protect the corporation's interests. The Final Draft stays true to
the entity as client concept of Model Rule 1.13 subparts (a), (b), (d), and
(e), while the Rules adopt the board as client concept advanced by Mr.
Jonas and adopted, sotto voce in the American Lawyers Code of
Conduct.50
The Rules version of Model Rule 1.13(c) takes the position that, if
the board has refused to act to protect the corporation, the corporation's
attorney must accept that decision as final and as subject to the duty of
confidentiality that the attorney should accord the client. 5' The only
course of conduct the Rules authorize, other than silent continuation as
the corporation's attorney, is resignation with continued silence regard-
ing the board's action and the underlying constituent misconduct. Thus,
subpart (c) subordinates the interests of the corporation, which is the
46. See THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 2.5 (Revised Draft 1982)
[hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT].
47. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 46, Rule 2.5; see supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 23.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
51. The corporation attorney's duty of confidentiality regarding the board's decision and
the underlying constituent misconduct is clarified in comment 6. This comment provides that
the provisions of Rule 1.13 do not limit the lawyer's responsibility of confidentiality under
Rule 1.6. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13 comment (Relation to Other Rules).
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attorney's client under subpart (a), and directs the lawyer to act as if the
board was the lawyer's client. This prescription is established for the
very situation in which the attorney's duty to act to protect the corporate
entity from being abused is most crucial: those situations where the
board has decided for its own reasons not to protect the corporation's
interests.
It is true that the board will be liable for breaching its fiduciary duty
to the corporation, but the breach of this obligation probably will be hard
to detect and may cause irremedial harm to the corporation. 52 It is most
likely that the board will refuse to act to protect the corporation when
the board has collectively engaged in misconduct and wishes to keep the
fact secret, or when individual officers that have engaged in misconduct
can persuade the board to take no action and to keep the matter secret.
In such situations, the corporation as an entity and the general share-
holder interests that the entity represents are most in need of the protec-
tion of the corporation lawyer's skill and efforts. Under the Rules, the
corporation lawyer is prohibited from doing so as a matter of profes-
sional ethics.
53
The Final Draft approach to the issue of board acquiesence in con-
stituent misconduct was very different. If a three-part test is satisfied
under the Final Draft subpart (c), the corporation's lawyer would have
the option of revealing the information about the constituent misconduct
and the board's acquiesence in it to the corporation's shareholders or to
authorities. Thus the lawyer was authorized to reveal such information
if the board's acquiesence to the constituent misconduct was for the pur-
52. For a general statement of the board's fiduciary duty to the corporation, see H. HENN
& J. ALEXANDER, supra note 19, § 235, at 625-28.
53. The ABA House of Delegates took a similar approach when considering the Final
Draft version of rule 1.6, the provision setting out the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. The
ABA decided against giving attorneys the option to disclose a client's secrets in a number of
situations in order to protect innocent people from fraud or other harm. Specifically. the Rules
version precludes attorneys from divulging client secrets in every possible instance except
when it is necessary either to prevent a future crime involving the likelihood of death or sub-
stantial bodily harm or to protect or further the lawyer's own interests in any controversy
relating to the attorney's representation of the client. See MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule
1.13. The Final Draft authorized attorney disclosure to prevent future crimes or frauds likely
to result in substantial injury to the financial interest of a third party, to rectify the conse-
quences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act perpetrated with the use of the lawyer's serv-
ices, or "to comply with other law." See FINAL DRAFT, supra note 20, Rule 1.6.
In rejecting the Final Draft version of rule 1.6, the ABA chose to structure the standards
of professional ethics to protect the interests of the client over the interests of third parties. In
rejecting the Final Draft version of rule 1.13(c), the ABA chose to protect the interests of third
parties over those of the client. In the rule 1.13 situation, the third parties are in the position
to hire, fire and set compensation for the attorney.
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pose of furthering the "personal or financial interests of members of the
board," if those personal or financial interests conflicted with the corpo-
ration's interests, and if revealing the information was "necessary in the
best interest of the organization."
54
The Final Draft version of Model Rule 1.13(c) is consistent with the
entity as client concept, although tempered by the deference the attorney
should give to the disinterested business judgment of the board.55 It is
only when that judgment is both self-interested and adverse to the corpo-
ration's best interests that the attorney has the option to reveal the mis-
conduct to the corporation's shareholders or to third-party authorities.
The Final Draft version of subpart (c) is also consistent with the spirit of
Model Rule 5.4(c) as it appears in the Rules, because it allows the corpo-
ration attorney to exercise his or her professional judgment for the bene-




Although the Code embraces a "pure" entity theory, the Rules ver-
sion of Model Rule 1.13(c), effectively enacts the proposition Mr. Jonas
advances: In cases of constituent antagonism, the attorney's professional
obligation will be toward his ultimate client, the board of directors. This
proposition would be particularly significant in those instances in which
the board of directors of a corporation facing a hostile takeover is willing,
in order to save their positions or the positions of corporate management,
to squander the corporation's assets through poison pills, pac man de-
fenses and the like, or as a final step, to create insupportable golden
parachutes.
When faced with such a situation, the corporation lawyer should
have the option to take his or her concerns beyond the board of directors
54. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.13(c).
55. Courts generally apply the business judgment rule to the board's business decisions.
Under this standard, directors and officers of a corporation have no liability if they honestly
believe their decision was in the corporation's best interests and was the product of careful,
unbiased, and good faith business judgment. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 19,
§ 242, at 661-63.
56. A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs; or pays the lawyer to
render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering such legal services. MODEL RULES, supra note 2, Rule 5.4(c). This provision is
substantially identical to the terms of DR 5-107 in the Code. Rule 5.4(c), "Professional Inde-
pendence of a Lawyer," provides:
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs or pays the
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment in rendering such legal services.
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to the shareholders or to the appropriate authorities. This option, which
was proposed in the Final Draft version of Model Rule 1.13(c) but ulti-
mately rejected by the ABA, would significantly clarify the role of a cor-
poration attorney in cases of consituent antagonism.
